The Effect of Mergers on Innovation
研究了并购如何影响研发活动，发现并购在研发结果高度不确定时更有利，但在创新路径清晰时效果较差，且首次与后续创新替代性越强并购收益可能越高。
We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model with uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects: It may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect), increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect), and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). The model suggests mergers are more desirable when R&D outcomes are highly uncertain, but less so when the innovation path is clearer. A surprising policy implication is that the benefit of the merger may be higher if the first and subsequent innovations are closer substitutes.