Re-Examining the Outcome Effect: Do Performance Evaluations Discourage Auditors’ Professional Skepticism?
研究发现，审计师因未发现错报而获得较低评价的现象主要源于对发现错报的积极反应，而非对未发现的惩罚；及时反馈能帮助审计师在后续任务中保持专业怀疑，不必然损害审计质量。
SUMMARY Prior research shows that auditors exercising appropriate professional skepticism receive lower performance evaluations when they fail to identify misstatements compared with when they identify misstatements—recognized as an outcome effect. This robust finding has led to two common inferences, which we empirically examine: (1) supervisors penalize “fruitless skepticism” (Experiment 1), and (2) audit evaluation systems discourage professional skepticism, compromising audit quality (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that evaluation differences stem predominantly from positive reactions to misstatement identification. We find insufficient evidence to support negative reactions to nonidentification. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that timely performance evaluations are critical: when auditors receive prompt feedback, they maintain appropriate professional skepticism in subsequent tasks, even when the initial task resulted in fruitless skepticism. Although our results confirm the evaluation gap documented in prior research, they reveal that outcome effects manifest differently than previously assumed and do not necessarily threaten audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors by request. JEL Classifications: M42.