Regulating zombie mortgages
研究美国各州通过僵尸房产法后，要求贷款机构维护止赎中的房产，导致贷款审批更严格、利率更高，但贷款事后表现更好，同时贷款机构会策略性地维持违约贷款存活。
Abstract Using the adoption of Zombie Property Laws (ZL) across several US states, we show that requiring lenders to maintain properties in the foreclosure process affects mortgage lending decisions and standards. Difference-in-differences estimations using a state border design show that ZL incentivizes lenders to screen mortgage applications more carefully: they deny more applications and impose higher interest rates on originated loans, especially risky loans. In turn, these loans exhibit higher ex post performance. ZL also affects lender behavior after borrowers become distressed, causing them to strategically keep delinquent mortgages alive. Our findings inform the debate on policy responses to foreclosure crises.