Strategic 3-D Printing Technology Authorization for Spare Parts Under Demand Uncertainty
研究了供应商在需求不确定时是否应授权3D打印技术生产备件，发现高成本或低市场不确定性时应避免授权，并揭示了独家授权下的搭便车效应。
3D printing technology enables on-demand production of spare parts, but its implementation requires technology authorization from the supplier. This study investigates whether a supplier would opt to authorize 3D printing under uncertain market demand and how this decision is influenced by spare parts-related costs and market conditions. To address these questions, we develop a game-theoretic model involving a supplier, two symmetric original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and a 3D printing service provider to examine the equilibrium decisions of stakeholders. The impact of technology authorization is evaluated and validated through sensitivity analysis, and the outcomes are connected to practice. Although technology authorization enhances the supply chain's adaptability to market fluctuations, we find that the supplier should avoid granting authorization under the following conditions: the cost of 3D-printed spare parts is high, or market uncertainty is low. Interestingly, in the competitive setting, we uncover a free-riding effect under exclusive authorization, where the supplier's strategy can lead to a win-win-win outcome for all three parties. Furthermore, the results indicate that, under specific conditions, the supplier and the 3D printing service provider adopt opposing pricing strategies to sustain the OEMs' incentives to procure. Finally, robustness analyses confirm that our main conclusions remain consistent. These findings provide new insights into the strategic interactions among suppliers, OEMs, and 3D printing service providers, highlighting the complex trade-offs in technology authorization under demand uncertainty.