Labor Market Monopsony Power and the Dynamic Gains to Openness Reforms
将劳动力市场买方垄断嵌入动态异质性企业一般均衡模型，发现关税削减的福利收益在买方垄断下比完全竞争劳动力市场大四倍以上，而降低对外直接投资税则导致福利损失。
ABSTRACT We embed labor market monopsony into a dynamic heterogeneous‐firm general equilibrium model with exporting, horizontal FDI, and rich firm lifecycle dynamics. Rising marginal costs with monopsony slow and limit incumbent firm growth in response to liberalization, shifting adjustment to the extensive margin. Calibrated to US micro data, welfare gains from tariff reduction are over four times larger under monopsony than with perfect labor markets. The difference is mostly driven by new exporter creation and firm entry along the transition path. By contrast, lowering outward FDI taxes gives powerful quantitative welfare losses under monopsony, as firms undertake FDI to escape domestic wage pressure.