A Bullet on Bribe‐Givers: Corporate Bribery and the Cost of Debt
利用2015年中国刑法修正案，研究发现提高贿赂惩罚显著降低了高腐败地区企业的债务融资成本，其机制是减少娱乐支出和缓解财务困境，且该效应在法治薄弱地区、非沿海城市及竞争激烈市场中更明显。
ABSTRACT This study investigates the ramifications of corruption penalties on corporate debt financing. By employing the implementation of China's Amendment to the Criminal Law in 2015, we show that the heightened penalties for bribery significantly reduce firms' debt financing costs located in regions with higher levels of corruption. This reduction stems from decreased entertainment expenses and alleviated financial distress of firms. Furthermore, such mitigating effect is more pronounced in firms located in regions with weaker legal institutions and non‐coastal cities, or operating in fiercely competitive markets. We also find that firms increase charitable donations following the enactment of the Criminal Law, suggesting a shift from clandestine corruption towards more subtle philanthropic endeavours to maintain relationships with the government.