Social Preferences over Ordinal Outcomes
研究了当决策者只知道他人对选项的排序而缺乏基数信息时，人们如何形成社会偏好。发现多数人更看重防止他人得到最差结果，而非促成最优结果，且序数聚合原则在不同国家和领域具有稳定性。
We study social preferences in settings where someone who chooses on behalf of others knows how those individuals rank the available options but may lack cardinal information concerning those comparisons. Contrary to majoritarian principles, most people place more weight on preventing least preferred outcomes for others than on enabling most preferred outcomes. Ranks matter both intrinsically and because they provide a basis for inferring cardinal utility. Ordinal aggregation principles are stable across domains and countries with divergent political traditions. Designing attractive social choice mechanisms is challenging in practice partly because aggregation principles that make manipulation difficult yield outcomes people consider normatively unappealing.