Under the Radar: the Role of Subsidiaries in Concealing Political Favors in Chinese Land Transactions
研究发现，有公开政治关联的企业通过子公司获取土地价格折扣（12.1%-13.2%），折扣在透明度低、制度弱地区更显著，且与慈善捐赠正相关，反腐败运动能有效减少此类优惠。
Abstract This paper illustrates how firms with publicly disclosed political connections use subsidiaries to obtain preferential treatment in land markets. While the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay land prices comparable to those paid by other firms, their subsidiaries receive discounts of 12.1% – 13.2%. These discounts are more pronounced when land is acquired through less transparent methods, in regions with weaker institutional environments, and among private firms. The anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012 effectively mitigates corruption-related discounts, with the magnitude of the discounts negatively associated with campaign intensity. Additionally, larger discounts for subsidiaries are observed following greater charitable donations, suggesting a reciprocal relationship between firms and officials. Overall, the findings contribute to a broader understanding of how firms with publicly disclosed political ties use complex corporate structures to engage in rent-seeking behavior.