Complementor-consumer power on transaction platforms
通过多案例研究，分析了平台所有者作为规则制定者和经济参与者如何设计治理规则，影响互补者与消费者之间的规范性和功利性权力动态，发现平台治理规则削弱了互补者的权力地位，使权力向消费者倾斜。
Third-party transaction platforms have significantly reshaped complementor-consumer power dynamics. Based on a multiple-case study, we examined how being a rule-maker and an economic participant simultaneously, platform owners can design governance rules to affect complementor-consumer normative and utilitarian power dynamics, in contrast to those offline. Platform owners unevenly exercise power over complementors and consumers, undermining complementors' power position vis-à-vis consumers. In addition, platform governance rules further tilt complementor-consumer power dynamics to consumers. The findings contribute to both platform governance studies and the stakeholder theory by providing a theoretical framework to conceptualize complementor-stakeholder power dynamics under a governance where a stakeholder assumes both regulatory and economic roles. • A power trio among complementors, consumers, and platform owners. • Platform owners take dual roles—rule maker and a transaction beneficiary. • Platforms weakened complementors' power over consumers. • Complementors must adopt counteractive strategies.