Banking with Inside Money: An Efficiency Analysis
研究了在名义Diamond-Dybvig经济中，内部货币无法实现最优资源配置，央行非常规政策可改善储户福利，最后贷款人工具可防止银行挤兑。
Abstract We show that banks do not decentralize the first best in a nominal Diamond–Dybvig economy with inside money. Furthermore, state‐contingent deposit contracts do not expand the consumption possibility set to include the first best either. Central banks can improve welfare but only for savers and only with unconventional monetary policy. Finally, central banks could prevent runs using their lender‐of‐last‐resort facility. These results suggest that, without an explicit incorporation of inside money, it is not trivial to provide a theoretical argument about the ability of the banking sector to efficiently supply liquidity in our economies.