CEO Risk Orientation and Environmental Sustainability Disclosure: Managerial Discretion, Institutional Constraints, and Strategic Transparency
研究CEO风险态度如何影响企业环境信息披露，发现风险规避型CEO披露更少，且这种关系受制度约束（如GRI标准、强制CSR报告、国有控股和污染行业）的调节。
ABSTRACT This study examines whether CEO risk orientation shapes environmental sustainability disclosure (ESD) and how institutional constraints condition this relationship. We argue that environmental disclosure constitutes a strategic exposure decision because greater transparency can increase regulatory scrutiny and stakeholder pressure. Using 37,779 firm‐year observations of Chinese A‐share listed firms from 2009 to 2023, we find that firms led by more risk‐averse CEOs disclose significantly less environmental information; additional analyses show that greater environmental disclosure is associated with higher environmental litigation exposure. However, the relationship weakens in contexts that constrain managerial discretion, including the adoption of Global Reporting Initiative standards, mandatory CSR reporting requirements, state ownership, and pollution‐intensive industries. These findings highlight the behavioral foundations of sustainability disclosure and demonstrate how institutional governance moderates executive influence over corporate transparency.