Keeping Up With the Joneses: Spillover Effect of M&A Activity to Compensation
研究发现，即使CEO所在公司未进行并购，只要其薪酬参照公司有并购活动，该CEO的薪酬也会增加，且薪酬对负业绩的敏感性降低，揭示了并购活动通过劳动力市场压力和自利行为影响高管薪酬的溢出机制。
ABSTRACT We identify a spillover effect from Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity to CEO compensation. Previous research shows that post‐merger, acquiring CEOs receive higher pay with reduced sensitivity to negative performance. We demonstrate that CEOs who don't engage in M&A, but have compensation peers who do, also experience increased pay and decreased pay‐performance sensitivity for negative returns. Additionally, M&A activity significantly influences compensation peer group composition. Our results reveal the effect of peer M&A on compensation results from both labour market pressures and self‐dealing, contributing to explanations for the substantial rise in CEO compensation in recent decades.