Getting aggressive abroad through CEO and outside director stock options: An incentive‐based view of post‐entry internationalization pace of young entrepreneurial post‐IPO firms
研究了年轻创业公司IPO并首次海外扩张后，CEO和外部董事的股票期权激励如何影响其国际化速度，发现CEO期权越多速度越快，而外部董事期权会削弱这一效应。
Abstract Research Summary This study develops an incentive‐based view to examine the internationalization pace of young entrepreneurial firms after they have completed an IPO and expanded abroad for the first time. Using a sample of U.S. young entrepreneurial post‐IPO firms that internationalized from 2005 to 2020, we find that the pace of internationalization increases when CEOs are compensated with more stock options and that this relationship is weakened when the stock option compensation of independent outside directors increases. By showing that incentives of different agents shape how fast young entrepreneurial firms internationalize, this study extends international entrepreneurship research by relaxing the implicit assumption that young entrepreneurial post‐IPO firms that can internationalize fast will do so. Managerial Summary What determines the internationalization pace of young entrepreneurial firms after they have already completed an IPO and expanded abroad for the first time? Our research finds that the internationalization pace of these firms increases when the CEO is compensated with more stock options. Absent CEO stock options, stock option compensation of independent outside directors provides a substitute through monitoring and advocacy for faster internationalization. Our research highlights that young post‐IPO firms that can internationalize fast will not necessarily do so, stressing the distinction between the firm resources needed for a strategic action and top management motivation to pursue that action.