Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states
研究了在底层博弈无优势可解时，全局博弈中风险占优均衡仍能被选中的条件，发现离散收益变化可产生严格优势，并用公共品提供模型说明。
We extend global games<i> á la </i>Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to environments where the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected even if there is no dominance solvable game in the underlying class of games. Strict dominance can emerge in the global game from strategic uncertainty due to discrete payoff changes in underlying games, and we provide sufficient conditions on payoff changes that warrant iterated dominance of the risk-dominant equilibrium. Thus, strategic uncertainty creates strictly dominant actions as well as fostering iterated dominance, in contrast to global games hitherto where strategic uncertainty does only the latter. Discrete payoff changes tend to arise, in particular, in situations where a public good can be provided with varying degrees of coordination depending on the state, so that coordinating actions can be strategic substitutes and free-riding incentives are present. We illustrate our findings in a stylized public good provision model.