The Equilibrium Effects of Eviction Policies
构建了一个租房市场动态均衡模型，内生产生租金违约和驱逐现象，发现加强驱逐保护反而加剧住房不安全并降低福利，而租金援助能改善福利。
ABSTRACT I propose a dynamic equilibrium model of rental markets that endogenously gives rise to defaults on rents and evictions. In the model, eviction protections make it harder to evict delinquent renters, but higher default costs to landlords increase equilibrium rents. I quantify the model using micro data on evictions, rents, and homelessness. I find that stronger eviction protections exacerbate housing insecurity and lower welfare. The key empirical driver of this result is the persistent nature of risk underlying rent delinquencies. Rental assistance reduces housing insecurity and improves welfare because it lowers the likelihood that renters default ex ante.