Central bank independence and accountability
综述了中央银行独立性的最新研究，发现法律独立性指数存在显著差异，且法律独立性无法完全抵御政治压力，政治压力常导致政策变更，多数研究显示独立性与通胀负相关，问责制常被等同于透明度。
• This paper provides an overview of recent research on central bank independence. • Legal CBI indexes differ substantially for some of the considered central banks. • Legal independence does not shield central banks from political pressure. • Political pressure often causes central banks to change their policies. • Most recent studies suggest negative relationship between CBI and inflation. • Central bank accountability is often equated with transparency. This paper provides an overview of recent research on central bank independence. First, we examine several indicators of legal independence and show that, although these indexes are mostly based on the one proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992), they reveal striking differences among some of the considered central banks. Today, central bankers face many challenges to their independence, including the growing influence of populist politicians and mounting government debt. We discuss recent studies examining the drivers of central bank independence, including political influences. There is substantial evidence that legal independence does not shield central banks from political pressure. Studies on political pressure demonstrate that populist governments are not the only ones to exert pressure on their central banks. Political pressure often causes central banks to change their policies. Most recent studies examining changes in legal central bank independence suggest a negative relationship between the two. There is a widespread belief that independent central banks should be held accountable. However, accountability is often equated with transparency. In our view, accountability should also include the ability to sanction central banks if they fail to meet the monetary policy objectives outlined in their mandates.