Collusion-proof decentralized autonomous organizations
研究了区块链去中心化自治组织中，当投票者策略行事且系统不够去中心化时，贿赂如何破坏对恶意行为的制裁，并提出了随机投票和掩蔽投票两种缓解机制。
A first-order design task in blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations is to ensure that malicious actors are sanctioned. We show that, when voters act strategically and the system is insufficiently decentralized, payoff-matching bribes undermine the sanctioning of malicious actors under conventional governance. Our framework formalizes DAO voting mechanisms and lets us identify those that mitigate the problem. Stochastic voting decouples a tokenholder’s influence from the voting behavior of others. Thus, bribery-proofness can be restored in the presence of sufficiently centralized governance tokenholders. Alternatively, masked voting increases resilience against bribery. Our work contributes to the broader debate on the merits and pitfalls of decentralization and highlights the need to align governance mechanisms with the degree of decentralization in blockchain networks.