A case for a Keynesian–Schumpeterian problem-solving central banking: Bridging the law-practice gap
提出凯恩斯-熊彼特问题解决型中央银行模型，解释当前央行独立且积极作为的实践，回应保守派和民粹派对央行合法性的批评，对研究央行治理和货币政策的经济学者有参考价值。
Abstract In recent years, central banks have significantly altered their practices, widening the law–practice gap between their formal legal mandates and their actual policy conduct. Monetary conservatives call for a return to the old consensus on economic and constitutional grounds, whereas monetary populists call for the re-politicisation of money by returning monetary powers to elected officials. Although these positions oppose each other, both regard the current configuration as illegitimate because it departs from the governing principles of liberal democracy, regardless of its economic effectiveness. While economists have recognised the economic merits of this configuration, the political and legal criticism levelled against it by conservatives and populists has remained unanswered. This article offers such an answer. It contends that the present configuration of central banking is best understood as reflecting a Keynesian–Schumpeterian problem-solving model: independent yet activist, separate from government but not bound by rigid rules. The article argues that this model represents the most reasonable compromise between the legal and constitutional constraints of liberal democracies, the non-ergodicity of capitalist economies, and the shortcomings of representative democracy. This model draws on post-Keynesian economic assumptions, supply-side theories of democracy, and a Schumpeterian notion of technocracy.