Markov-Perfect Equilibria in Differential Games—With an Application to Climate Policy
研究了微分博弈中不连续的马尔可夫策略，给出了最佳反应和马尔可夫完美纳什均衡的充要条件，并在气候变化减缓模型中得到了全部对称均衡，发现最优均衡能显著改善福利。
Abstract We analyse discontinuous Markovian strategies for differential games. The best response correspondence uniquely maps almost all profiles of opponents’ strategies back to the strategy space. We thus make Markov-perfect equilibria in a wide class of differential games well-behaved, resolving a long-standing open problem. We provide a readily applicable necessary and sufficient condition for best responses and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria. We demonstrate our methods in a canonical model of non-cooperative mitigation of climate change. Our approach provides novel, economically important results: we obtain the entire set of symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria and demonstrate that the best equilibria can yield a major welfare improvement over the equilibrium which previous literature has focused on. International climate negotiations can be seen as being about coordination on good equilibria, rather than about bargaining over the limited surplus available in a dynamic prisoner’s dilemma.