Regret in durable‐good monopoly
研究了耐用品垄断卖家在最小化终身遗憾时的最优机制，发现该机制时间一致但需承诺支持，无承诺时可能无法售给所有买家，但频繁报价下会立即以最低估值成交。
I study a dynamic model of durable‐good monopoly where the seller minimizes lifetime regret against the worst‐case type of buyer. The optimal mechanism is time consistent: at no point can the seller benefit from replacing it with another mechanism. Despite this, the optimal mechanism cannot be supported in an equilibrium without commitment. This is because the seller's regret is endogenously determined by the best counterfactual payoffs he can obtain against every type, and these payoffs vary with his commitment power. When the seller lacks commitment, the good may not be sold to all types. However, in the limit as offers become frequent, the good is sold immediately at a price equal to the lowest buyer value.