Optimally stubborn. How long to hold and who will fold?
研究了声誉谈判中固执方选择初始要价时的均衡结果，发现当遇到固执方的概率较小时任何可行收益都可实现，概率较大时则要么立即达成协议要么长期拖延。
I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immediate agreement or long delays.