Competition and Nonprofit’s Strategic Responses: Evidence from Fundraising in Donative Markets
研究了非营利组织在捐赠市场中如何根据竞争对手的筹款活动调整自身策略，发现战略替代效应，并模拟减少竞争会降低均衡筹款水平。
Abstract Nonprofit organizations rely on donations from large competitive marketplaces to provide key social service goods. Most research focuses on competition in output markets without considering philanthropic markets where nonprofits make decisions about how much effort to put into fundraising. We develop and estimate a model that highlights the strategic nature of fundraising, showing that rival NP’s fundraising responses can be strategic complements or substitutes. We find evidence of strategic substitutes. NPs demonstrate nontrivial strategic responses to rival’s fundraising and, in totality, the across sector impacts are important to consider. Counterfactual exercises show that reducing competition decreases equilibrium fundraising levels.