Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure of product risk information: The roles of observability, product liability, and product-risk correlation
研究了在古诺竞争下，产品责任和风险相关性如何影响企业获取产品风险信息的激励，发现强制披露和自愿披露的激励排名可能因信息可观察性而逆转。
We compare incentives to acquire product-risk information under Cournot competition with product liability and correlated risks. Disclosure regimes are indexed by the probability that acquired information is discretionary rather than compulsory, so mandatory and voluntary disclosure are polar cases. Strategic concealment creates an opacity feedback: when acquisition effort is observable, higher effort changes how the market interprets silence. This can reduce acquisition incentives and overturn the standard acquisition-incentive ranking. We also identify a neutrality locus where market beliefs are payoff-irrelevant and acquisition incentives reflect only the output-adjustment value of information.