Strategic disclosure in networks
研究可验证信息通过中间人的策略性传递，发现完全披露要求所有玩家与决策者偏好同向；嵌入网络后，最优网络是按偏好排序的直线，且唯一抗联盟偏离。
I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication—two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other's decision, I find that the unique ex ante optimal network is a line where players are ordered by their bliss points. This is also the unique network immune to coalitional deviations.