Side effects of separating retail and investment banking: Evidence from the United Kingdom
利用英国圈护要求引入，研究发现分离零售与投资银行导致银行扩大抵押贷款、降低家庭信贷成本，但增加市场集中度并促使小银行风险贷款增加，同时减少银团贷款和信用额度。
Abstract The idea of separating retail and investment banking remains controversial. Exploiting the introduction of UK ring-fencing requirements, we show that this separation has a range of previously undocumented side effects for credit supply, competition, and risk-taking in credit markets not directly targeted by the reform. By redirecting the benefits of deposit funding toward retail activities, ring-fencing incentivises universal banks to expand mortgage lending. This rebalancing reduces the cost of household credit, without eroding lending standards. But it also increases mortgage market concentration, pushes smaller banks toward riskier lending, and is mirrored by a reduction in syndicated loans and credit lines.