Why Do People Protest? A Theory of Emotions, Public Policy, and Political Unrest
构建了一个政策制定模型，分析在抗议威胁下，政策制定者如何选择公共品投入，以及公民的情绪反应如何影响抗议概率和均衡结果。
Abstract We build a model of policymaking under the threat of unrest. A policymaker chooses how much effort to spend on a public good; effort is unobservable and the outcome conditional on effort is uncertain. A group of citizens protest if the outcome falls short of a reference point; the reference point is determined endogenously by expectations about the outcome and by the intensity of emotions. We show that the effects of stronger emotional reactions on policymaker’s effort and the probability of protest are nonmonotonic and depend on the group’s ability to inflict damage. Equilibrium may require the policymaker to randomize between providing some effort or no effort at all, in order to temper citizens’ expectations, in which case strong emotional reactions are counterproductive. Optimal emotional reactions are fine-tuned to minimize the probability of protest.