Board Independence and Adjustment Speed of CEO Inside Debt
研究发现，董事会独立性越强，企业调整CEO内部债务至最优水平的速度越快，但在代理成本较低时调整速度反而变慢，表明独立董事在调整中会权衡利弊。
ABSTRACT We find that firms with more independent directors adjust CEO inside debt towards an optimum more quickly. This effect is more pronounced in financially unconstrained, growth, and under‐levered firms, and also firms led by more powerful or overconfident CEOs. We find that when the agency cost of CEO inside debt is low, board independence is associated with a slower adjustment speed. The ability of corporate boards to design CEO compensation contracts in the shareholders' best interest has come under intense scrutiny. Our evidence suggests that independent directors make intricate trade‐off decisions when adjusting them in ways consistent with the optimal‐contracting perspective.