Optimal Two-Sided Pricing and Service Introduction Strategies for Competing Platforms
研究两个竞争平台在引入新服务时的最优定价策略，发现平台通常会降低消费者端费用甚至补贴，而是否调整供应端价格取决于对手策略；竞争激烈时可能陷入囚徒困境，竞争弱时则更可能双赢。
Nowadays, many two-sided platforms are actively launching new services beyond their main service to reach a broader range of consumers (e.g., A map adding local lifestyle services in addition to its navigation service). As users migrate across different services, the original two-sided pricing mechanisms are altered due to network effects. Furthermore, different service introduction strategies adopted by competing platforms also reshape the competitive landscape. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical model to examine the optimal pricing strategies of two competing platforms when introducing new services. We theoretically show that when platforms introduce new services, they typically reduce consumer-side fees or even offer subsidies. However, on the provider side, whether platforms adjust their pricing strategies depends on the service introduction strategies of their competitors. Counter intuitively, the profitability of new services does not depend solely on their development costs; the intensity of market competition also leads platforms to adopt different equilibrium strategies. When competition is intense, platforms may fall into a “prisoner's dilemma” when introducing new services. In contrast, when competition is weak, introducing new services is more likely to result in a win-win outcome. Finally, we show that service complementarity increases the likelihood of a prisoner's dilemma but does not affect the win-win outcome. We further extend the analysis by endogenizing the user conversion rate and introducing asymmetric consumer base utility, and show that our main findings remain robust.