Stockpile agreement and catastrophe insurance strategies for relief organisation: a multi-follower Stackelberg game model
本文构建了一个多跟随者斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型，研究救援组织如何通过储备协议和巨灾保险联合决策来降低社会成本，并基于云南昭通的案例验证了三方合作机制的有效性。
Stockpile agreements with suppliers and catastrophe insurance help relief organisations share disaster response risks and ease the burden of relief efforts. This paper presents a multi-follower Stackelberg game model to facilitate three-party cooperation, where the relief organisation considers stockpile agreement and catastrophe insurance in a joint decision perspective. The organisation minimises the social cost of prepositioning through its storage, stockpile agreement, and insurance, while the supplier and insurance company aim to maximise their profits. We also incorporate budget constraints to explore how the relief organisation should allocate funds between the two parties. A two-party Stackelberg game model that only considers stockpile agreements is introduced as a benchmark model and compared with the three-party game model in this study. Lastly, a case study in Zhaotong, Yunnan Province, demonstrates that the three-party cooperation mechanism significantly reduces social costs and improves relief effectiveness. A balanced budget allocation strategy is recommended for relief organisations within budget constraints. The mechanism offers a win-win solution for all parties from a long-term and sustainable perspective.