Labor-Law Compliance in an Informal Labor Market
研究哥伦比亚应美国要求改革劳动监察系统的影响，发现增加监察员能提升正规部门劳动法合规，但对非正规部门无影响，且正规部门企业通过减少工资税缴纳来部分抵消成本上升。
Abstract I study the effects of a reform of the system of labor inspection in Colombia, which was requested by the United States as part of the negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement. An additional labor inspector increases labor-law compliance in the formal sector (i.e., among registered firms), while there is no effect in the informal sector. There is also a decrease in the probability of working informally in the formal sector, while overall employment remains unchanged. Complementary evidence from an enterprise survey shows that firms in the formal sector compensate for part of the increase in labor costs by reducing payroll contributions.