Addressing weak links in government implementation at scale: Experimental evidence from a school governance reform in Tanzania
通过随机实验评估坦桑尼亚学校治理改革中，向地方监督员发送短信提醒以推动学校落实检查建议的效果，发现该低成本干预使学生学习成绩提升0.11个标准差，且效果集中在有外部资源支持的地区。
This paper demonstrates how low-cost innovations can improve the implementation of costly government programs. We experimentally evaluate the nationwide roll-out of a new school governance program in Tanzania. As part of the program, school inspectors conduct Whole School Visits (WSVs) producing a set of school-specific ratings and recommendations—targeted at leadership, teachers, and parents—for improving school quality. However, schools faced weak incentives to implement the recommendations, and the local monitors responsible for conducting follow-up visits, who report to a different ministry, lacked direct access to WSV reports. To address this challenge, in a randomly sampled subset of program schools, monitors received text messages informing them of the main recommendations and encouraging them to follow up with schools to ensure compliance. Within the sample of schools that received WSVs, text messages improved student learning by 0.11 standard deviations after two years. Treatment effects are larger for schools that received worse inspection ratings in each domain, consistent with monitors acting on tailored rather than generic recommendations. Observed gains are concentrated in regions exposed to a donor program that provided local bureaucrats with resources to monitor. Our findings show how addressing specific bottlenecks in implementation can significantly enhance the effectiveness of government programs at scale.