Dishonest Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in Politically Connected Firms: Does anti-Corruption Make a Difference?
研究中国2012年反腐败运动如何影响政治关联企业的企业社会责任披露不诚实行为，发现反腐败削弱了政治庇护，促使企业采取更谨慎的披露策略。
This study examines how China’s 2012 anti-corruption campaign affected corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure among politically connected firms from the perspective of CSR dishonesty. We find that politically connected firms significantly reduce their CSR disclosure relative to unconnected firms following the campaign. The evidence suggests that anti-corruption weakens political patronage that previously enabled symbolic CSR practices and increases the exposure risk associated with dishonest disclosure. Consequently, connected firms adopt a more cautious disclosure strategy, particularly when external scrutiny is stronger. Our findings highlight how political ties shape firms’ non-financial reporting incentives and demonstrate that anti-corruption can curb impression management behaviour.