Can Stablecoins Be Stable?
构建了一个稳定币通用模型，分析不同协议设计维持与法定货币挂钩的能力，发现算法支持比抵押更脆弱，而不可篡改的智能合约和去中心化发行有助于增强稳定性。
This paper provides a general model of stablecoins, cryptocurrencies pegged to a traditional currency. We characterize the optimal design of a stablecoin protocol that generates seigniorage fees from issuance. We use this framework to assess the ability of various protocol designs to maintain the peg. Our model rationalizes algorithmic backing of stablecoins but highlights its greater fragility relative to collateralization. Immutable smart contracts improve stability because the issuer suffers from a commitment problem. Even under full collateralization, promises to repurchase stablecoins when demand drops are not credible. Alternatively, the protocol can restore commitment by decentralizing issuance, and this highlights a new benefit of DeFi protocols. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06992 .