CEO Narcissism and Related Party Transactions
研究发现CEO自恋程度越高，公司越容易发生关联方交易，且这些交易在高自恋CEO的公司中会损害企业绩效，但强有力的董事会监督能缓解这种负面影响。
ABSTRACT We examine the association between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of engaging in related party transactions (RPTs) and its influence on the value implications of these transactions. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of board monitoring on the relationship between CEO narcissism and the value effects of RPTs. We find that CEO narcissism is positively associated with the propensity for RPT engagements. We also highlight the detrimental effect of RPTs conducted by narcissistic CEOs by documenting that RPT engagements have a negative (positive) effect on firm performance at high (low) levels of CEO narcissism. In addition, we show that strong board monitoring moderates the negative influence of CEO narcissism on the value implications of RPTs. Overall, we find evidence of the opportunistic behavior of narcissistic CEOs engaging in value‐reducing RPTs. We also underscore the significance of board monitoring in mitigating the adverse effects of CEO narcissism on the RPT‐firm performance association.