Collateral impact: how rivalry diffuses shareholder activism threats
研究股东积极主义针对竞争对手时，如何间接影响非目标企业的战略行为，发现财务动机的积极主义会减少非目标企业的竞争增长和CSR行动，而社会动机的积极主义则减少增长但增加CSR行动。
This study examines how shareholder activism directed at rivals can indirectly influence the strategic actions of a non-targeted firm. Using the Awareness–Motivation–Capability (AMC) framework, we theorize that firms respond to consequential activism campaigns targeting their rivals by adjusting their competitive growth and social responsibility actions. We distinguish between financially motivated shareholder activism, which carries implicit disciplinary threats, and socially motivated shareholder activism, which carries implicit reputational threats. We argue that financially motivated activism at rivals triggers non-targeted firms to reduce both competitive growth and CSR actions, while socially motivated activism at rivals reduces growth but increases CSR actions of non-targeted firms. We further propose that the intensity of rivalry, shareholder composition and firm status moderate these relationships. We contribute to research on interorganizational diffusion, shareholder activism and social movements.