A coalitional extension of the ordinal Shapley-Shubik value
针对三人讨价还价问题中Shapley-Shubik规则忽略大小为2的适当子联盟价值这一缺陷，提出一种不可转移效用博弈的推广解，该解在可转移效用博弈中总属于核心，并应用于矿业与自然资源管理案例。
Abstract In cooperative game theory it is known that two-person bargaining problems have no relevant ordinal solution. For three-player bargaining problems, Shapley and Shubik propose an ordinal rule. However, this rule does not take into account the worth of proper subcoalitions of size 2. In this paper, we fill this gap by proposing a generalization of the Shapley-Shubik rule for non transferable utility games. The resulting solutions, when applied to transferable utility games, always belong to the core, which makes it a relevant alternative to other core-selectors such as the nucleolus. We also apply the new solution to a practical case related to mining and natural resources management.