Lobbying and rotating leadership
研究了国际组织中轮值领导制如何影响利益集团的游说策略，发现当国家担任欧盟轮值主席国时，利益集团会增加雇佣商业游说者以获取政策制定者接触机会。
Abstract Economic and political decisions are increasingly made in international organizations (IOs). A distinctive feature of many IOs is that they operate under a system of rotating leadership (e.g. a committee chair that rotates annually). Despite the widespread use of such systems and their potential value to interest groups, we know surprisingly little about how interest groups respond to rotating leadership in IOs. Using both micro- and macro-level data on the economic performance of commercial lobbyists in the European Union, I show that interest groups respond strategically to short-term shifts in leadership. Specifically, when a country takes over the rotating EU Council Presidency, interest groups increase their use of commercial lobbyists to gain access to policymakers from the presiding country.