Do Medical Health Ministers Make Different Health System Choices?
研究利用OECD国家21年面板数据，发现具有医学背景的卫生部长虽不增加总医疗支出，但会将预算更多转向预防性医疗（增加11%-14%），并可能降低死亡率、增加医生和护士密度。
ABSTRACT Healthcare decision‐making is a highly specialized domain of government, particularly at the central or federal level, which may partly explain why medical professionals are sometimes appointed to ministerial roles within government cabinets. However, does a minister with medical expertise in healthcare make a difference in the outcomes and outputs of a health system? We examine original data on the medical doctor (MD) backgrounds of health ministers in Western countries to disentangle these effects. Drawing on longitudinal evidence from a long panel of OECD countries over 21 years, and a differences in differences design we find that, although MD ministers do not increase overall healthcare spending, they do engage in some level of strategic budget reallocation by spending 11%–14% more on preventative care such as vaccines, irrespective of political leanings, though results are weaker under coalition governments. Notably, we find some evidence that MD ministers reduce overall mortality and increase the density of physicians in European Union (EU) countries and nurses in small countries.