When Reforms Becomes Symbolic: Decabinetisation in Portugal and Beyond
研究了政府为何会限制自身依赖的政治幕僚机构（部长内阁），以葡萄牙2012年改革为例，发现这类改革常是回应社会压力的象征性行动，实际效果被内部力量稀释。
ABSTRACT Decabinetisation—policies that reduce or restrict ministerial cabinets—presents a paradox in contemporary executive politics. Despite growing reliance on these structures for political coordination and policy steering, governments occasionally move to limit their reliance on these political staff structures, either by reducing staff numbers or by imposing stricter rules on appointments, recruitment, and remuneration. While several such reforms have been documented, we still lack a clear understanding of why governments would deliberately limit the resources and authority of the very actors that support their political and policy work. Using the 2012 Passos Coelho reform in Portugal as an in‐depth case study, this article demonstrates that decabinetisation often functions as a symbolic response to mounting political and societal demands for restraint. Although Prime Minister Passos Coelho initially aimed to implement an ambitious overhaul, internal governmental dynamics during the design and implementation stages enabled continuity actors to dilute the reform's most transformative elements. The findings highlight decabinetisation as a strategic response to a policy trap: governments must be seen to act but lack the capacity or incentive to alter institutional dependence on MCs. These dynamics extend beyond Portugal, helping to explain similar initiatives in other systems with cabinetised executives.