The Tragedy of Complexity
研究了当代理人注意力有限时，均衡复杂性通常无效率：理解充分的产品过于复杂，而理解不足的产品则过于简化，并应用于金融机构与监管机构、CEO与部门互动场景。
Complexity can create value. At the same time, understanding more complex goods requires more of an agent’s attention. We show that equilibrium complexity is generally inefficient when agents face competing demands on their limited attention. Because attention allocation is hump-shaped in complexity, equilibrium complexity is distorted toward intermediate levels: well-understood goods are inefficiently complex, whereas less well-understood goods are oversimplified. We apply our model to financial institutions facing regulatory bodies and CEOs interacting with corporate divisions. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, finance. Funding: This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [Grant 715467].