Shareholder Coordination and Waste Management
基于2010-2022年标普500公司数据，研究发现股东协调程度越高，企业废物产生越少，且这一效应在CEO薪酬差距大、董事会独立性弱、分析师覆盖低的企业中更强。
ABSTRACT This study examines how shareholder coordination relates to corporate waste management. Drawing on 1059 firm‐year observations from S&P 500 firms between 2010 and 2022, we show that higher levels of coordination among shareholders correspond to reduced waste generation. This effect is more pronounced in firms whose coordinated shareholders are more common. Moreover, we find that this negative coordination–waste link is stronger in firms with a higher CEO pay gap, lower board co‐option, and lower analyst coverage. Furthermore, we propose that shareholder coordination reduces waste generation through three mechanisms: agency costs, information asymmetry, and financial constraints. Our main results remain robust after a variety of endogeneity tests.