Cost Information, Insider Trading, and Product Market Equilibrium
研究基于私有成本信息的内幕交易如何影响产品市场均衡，发现成本方差不同的企业会过度或不足生产，导致企业价值分化。
ABSTRACT We study how insider trading based on private cost information affects product market outcomes when firms differ in cost variance. In our model, managers exploit firm‐specific cost information to pursue short‐term trading gains, leading them to adjust output decisions and reshape product market competition. We show that trading opportunities have heterogeneous effects on firms' production and value: firms with high cost variance overproduce, whereas those with low cost variance underproduce; correspondingly, the value of firms with high cost variance rises, while that of firms with low cost variance declines. These results demonstrate how heterogeneous costs and private cost information create real economic consequences by linking insider trading incentives to distortions in product market competition and firm value.