管理者薪酬不平等与市场势力

Manager Pay Inequality and Market Power

Review of Economic Studies · 2026
被引 0
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了1980年以来管理者薪酬不平等加剧与市场势力上升的关系,发现市场势力平均解释45.2%的管理者薪酬,对顶层管理者影响更大,2019年达80.3%。

Abstract

Abstract Manager pay has increased considerably since 1980, and so has inequality in manager pay. Over the same period, there has been a sharp rise in market power. We start from the premise that the role of managers is to increase firm productivity. When markets are imperfectly competitive, productivity not only helps firm grow in size, productivity also affects market power. We model how imperfect competition in product markets affects manager pay, and break down the contributions of firm size and market power to compensation. We find that market power, on average, accounts for 45.2% of total manager pay. Notably, there is substantial variation across managers. Top managers are disproportionately employed by firms with market power, and they benefit from it: in 2019, 80.3% of top manager pay is attributable to market power. Our main conclusion is that rise of market power explains half of the increase in average manager pay, and nearly all of the increase in manager pay inequality.

管理者薪酬不平等市场势力高管薪酬产品市场竞争