Central Bank Digital Currency with Collateral‐Constrained Banks
研究了央行数字货币与银行存款竞争家庭流动性时，对银行中介的风险，发现央行可通过贷款维持均衡，但银行需牺牲企业信贷来持有抵押品。
Abstract We analyze risks to bank intermediation following the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) competing with commercial bank deposits as households' source of liquidity. We revisit the equivalence of payment systems result, introducing a collateral constraint on banks' borrowing from the central bank. Comparing equilibria with and without CBDC, we find that the central bank can ensure the same equilibrium allocation by offering loans to banks. However, to access loans, banks must hold collateral at the expense of extending credit to firms. While CBDC introduction has no real effects, it changes aggregate capital ownership and banks' business models.