Common Auditors and Credit Costs in Times of Crisis: Evidence From the COVID‐19 Pandemic
研究发现，在COVID-19大流行期间，贷款方和借款方拥有共同审计师能缓解疫情对银团贷款定价的不利影响，使贷款利差降低2.5%，且不影响贷款质量。
ABSTRACT We provide evidence that common auditors among lenders and borrowers mitigate the aggravating effect of COVID‐19 on syndicated loan pricing. Specifically, a common auditor alleviates lenders’ COVID‐19 exposure constraints, resulting in a 2.5% decrease in the offered loan spread. This easing effect is magnified by the length of the auditor‐lender tenure; it is concentrated in loans between highly exposed lender–borrower pairs and, notably, further facilitates access to loan financing for auditor‐connected borrowers. Nonetheless, this does not constitute irresponsible lending behavior based on a comparison of ex post loan performance for borrowers with common auditors versus their non‐common‐auditor counterparts. Our results highlight an important yet overlooked function of common auditors: their ability to act as a broker between lenders and borrowers during periods of heightened stress.