Shifting the reference point in environmental regulation: from polluter‐pays to beneficiaries‐compensate
研究了在排放难以监测且减排成本私有的情况下，如何通过基于可验证减排量的市场式安排实现有效减排，并提出了受益者补偿转移方案。
Abstract In many environmental problems, emissions are hard to monitor and abatement costs are privately known. We study how efficient abatement nevertheless can be induced through market‐like arrangements that condition transfers on verifiable abatement rather than on measured emissions. We characterize the transfer schemes that implement efficient abatement in unique dominant strategies and show that a single scheme, the beneficiaries‐compensate transfer scheme, emerges under two distinct characterizations: one based on equilibrium properties and one grounded in classical fairness axioms. Under the beneficiaries‐compensate transfer scheme, each agent compensates others according to the benefits received from their abatement. We illustrate its usefulness in two applications.