A Critical Analysis of the Judicial Approach to Intersectional Natural Hair Discrimination in the UK: G v St Gregory’s Catholic Science College
本文批判分析英国《2010年平等法》单一框架无法识别交叉性歧视，以自然发型歧视为例，结合G案司法判决，揭示法律对多重身份歧视的忽视。
Abstract Conventional anti-discrimination law in the UK, the Equality Act 2010, is governed by a single-axis framework which requires individuals to make a discrimination claim on the basis of a single category of discrimination. Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality reveals the existence of a distinct form of discrimination, intersectional discrimination, which is unable to be recognised by the single-dimension logic embedded within the conventional legislative approach. Due to the fundamental limitation of having discrete categories within which discrimination has to be placed, certain forms of intersectional discrimination are not included within the conventional criteria of anti-discrimination law. This article acknowledges hair discrimination as a form of intersectional discrimination, that is, ‘intersectional natural hair discrimination’, and critically examines the current judicial position, as exemplified in G v St Gregory’s Catholic Science College, through a detailed intersectional critique.