IMF Conditionality on Corruption: The Politics of Good Governance
研究了IMF在1980至2019年间对腐败问题的贷款条件，发现政治成本（如受援国稳定风险）和制度成本（如战略国家豁免）导致其更多采用间接条件而非直接反腐措施，1997年指南出台后条件应用更均衡。
ABSTRACT We offer a systematic analysis of IMF loan conditionality on corruption and argue that the Fund's pursuit of anti‐corruption measures is tempered by two political costs. First, because corruption is politically sensitive, the IMF risks destabilizing recipient governments and provoking crises. Second, these domestic risks translate into institutional costs: imposing such measures in strategically important countries (e.g., US allies or temporary UNSC members) can alienate key stakeholders. We posit that clear institutional guidelines reduce these institutional costs by aligning members and staff and promoting a more even application across the membership. We test these claims on a novel dataset of IMF loan conditions from 1980 to 2019, built with machine‐learning tools that distinguish direct anti‐corruption conditions from indirect ones aimed at accountability and transparency. The results strongly support the theory: following the IMF's 1997 corruption guidelines, the application of anti‐corruption conditionality has become more even across multiple measures; yet, domestic political costs continued to steer the Fund toward indirect rather than direct conditions. Beyond illuminating how the IMF addresses a core impediment to development, the study highlights institutional evolution and how IOs balance competing pressures.