Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
分析了当被许可方面临未知专利持有人未来侵权主张风险时，最优许可合同的设计。研究表明，固定费用许可在无此类风险时最优，但未来专利主张的可能性使得加入单位许可费成为最优选择，该许可费作为租金保护机制，在配置效率与敲竹杠风险之间权衡。
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims. We show that the possibility of future patent claims makes it optimal to include a per‐unit royalty. The royalty reduces the surplus available to potential third‐party claimants and serves as a rent‐protection device, trading off allocative inefficiency against hold‐up risk. Restrictions on the contracting space can be justified when more realistic features of demand uncertainty or stochastic patent arrival are considered.