Error Rates, Detection Rates, and Payoff Functions in Auditing.
构建了一个审计师与被审计单位互动的博弈模型，推导纳什均衡策略，分析收益函数变化对错误率和检测率的影响，发现审计师收益变化对未检测错误和错误拒绝概率有明确影响，而被审计单位收益变化则通过双重作用产生不确定影响。
Abstract A stylized game theoretic model of auditor-auditee interactions is constructed. We derive Nash equilibrium strategies for the auditor and auditee, and then examine the effect of changes in the auditor-auditee payoff functions on error and detection rates. In particular, changes in auditors' payoffs in our model are shown to have unambiguous implications for the probability of undetected errors and the probability of incorrect rejection. In contrast, changes in auditees' payoffs may either increase or decrease undetected errors or incorrect rejections through a dual impact on error rates and detection rates. In addition, we compare the predictions of our game theoretic approach to those of a single person decision theoretic analysis.